Debunking Robot Rights Metaphysically, Ethically, and Legally

Machines lack the fundamental nature required for rights: The authors argue that robots and AI systems are not the type of entities that can meaningfully possess rights, grounding this position in phenomenology and cognitive science rather than abstract philosophy. This challenges the premise underlying much robot rights advocacy.

Current AI harms to vulnerable populations should be the priority: Rather than debating hypothetical rights for future sentient machines, the paper argues that AI ethics should focus on limiting harms that AI systems are already causing to marginalized communities through surveillance capitalism, environmental destruction, and entrenched injustice.

Robot rights could undermine human protections: Drawing parallels to corporate personhood, the authors warn that granting legal rights to machines could paradoxically weaken human rights protections—just as corporate rights have been used to advance corporate power over worker, consumer, and voter rights.

Robot rights discourse distracts from accountability: The paper contends that focusing on speculative robot rights creates a "smoke screen" that allows companies and theorists to avoid addressing the real legal accountability needed for current AI systems causing concrete harms today.

The corporate rights analogy reveals dangerous precedent: The authors suggest that if robot rights follow the corporate rights model, they would likely serve to concentrate power and protect corporate interests rather than establish meaningful protections for machines or society.