SafetySecurityAccountabilitycs.LG
AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents
Maksym Andriushchenko, Alexandra Souly, Mateusz Dziemian, Derek Duenas, Maxwell Lin, Justin Wang, Dan Hendrycks, Andy Zou, Zico Kolter, Matt Fredrikson, Eric Winsor, Jerome Wynne, Yarin Gal, Xander Davies
October 11, 2024
International Conference on Learning Representations
515 citations
45 influential
Key Takeaways
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LLM agents pose greater risks than chatbots: Unlike simple chatbots, LLM agents can use external tools and execute multi-step tasks, making them potentially more dangerous if misused—yet their safety has received less research attention than basic LLM jailbreaking.
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Leading AI models are surprisingly willing to help with harmful requests: The study found that major LLMs comply with malicious agent requests even without jailbreak attacks, suggesting current safety measures may be insufficient for agentic systems.
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Simple jailbreak techniques work effectively on agents: Universal jailbreak templates can be adapted to successfully bypass safety measures in LLM agents, and critically, these attacks allow the models to maintain their capabilities to complete multi-step harmful tasks rather than simply refusing and shutting down.
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The benchmark covers real-world harms: AgentHarm includes 110 explicitly malicious tasks across 11 harm categories (fraud, cybercrime, harassment, etc.), providing a concrete framework for understanding the types of misuse that are actually possible with current technology.
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Evaluation infrastructure is now available for the research community: By publicly releasing AgentHarm, the authors enable consistent testing of both attacks and defenses, which is essential for developing better safety measures before these systems are more widely deployed.