SafetySecurityTrustworthinesscs.CR
InfoFlood: Jailbreaking Large Language Models with Information Overload
Advait Yadav, Haibo Jin, Man Luo, Jun Zhuang, Haohan Wang
June 13, 2025
arXiv.org
4 citations
Key Takeaways
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A new vulnerability exists where overly complex language can bypass AI safety features: The research identifies "Information Overload" as a jailbreak method that doesn't require special prompting tricks—instead, it exploits how LLMs struggle to maintain safety guardrails when processing linguistically complex queries, suggesting current safety mechanisms may be brittle in unexpected ways.
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This attack works across major commercial AI systems: InfoFlood successfully compromised safety features in GPT-4o, GPT-3.5-turbo, Gemini 2.0, and LLaMA 3.1, indicating this vulnerability is not isolated to one company's model and represents a widespread concern across the AI industry.
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Attackers can automatically refine jailbreak attempts through iterative learning: The InfoFlood system doesn't just try once—it identifies why attacks fail and automatically adjusts the linguistic structure to succeed, meaning adversaries can systematically improve their attacks without human intervention.
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Current safety training may not account for linguistic complexity as a threat vector: Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use obvious manipulation tactics, Information Overload exploits a gap in how safety mechanisms handle legitimate-seeming but deliberately convoluted language, suggesting AI companies may need to rethink how they test and train safety systems.
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This research highlights the need for more robust safety evaluation methods: The findings suggest that testing LLM safety with standard prompts may miss real-world vulnerabilities, implying regulators and developers should expand their testing to include adversarial linguistic complexity.