Research Papers

Face de-identification (De-ID) aims to remove or conceal personally identifiable facial features in images or videos to prevent identity recognition while preserving utility for downstream tasks. With the rising emphasis on data privacy and responsible AI, face De-ID has emerged as an active research area spanning computer vision and privacy-preserving communities. Early approaches, and many contemporary ones, operate in the digital domain by modifying pixel-level or appearance-level features through post-capture processing. Recent advances extend face De-ID beyond post-processing by integrating privacy mechanisms directly into sensors during image acquisition, bridging sensing systems and downstream vision algorithms. In parallel, physical-domain methods explore wearable accessories and materials that conceal identity information in real-world environments prior to capture. In this survey, we present the first unified overview that spans the full data acquisition pipeline, encompassing the physical, sensor, and digital domains. Through this domain-centric lens, we systematically analyze current methodologies, technical progress, and the distinct challenges inherent to each stage. We then review and organize existing evaluation protocols, examining current practices and highlighting the critical need for standardized, comprehensive benchmarks. Finally, we identify key open problems and outline emerging research directions to guide future work in this rapidly evolving field. To support ongoing research, we maintain a project page that organizes relevant literature with collected datasets and open source code: https://github.com/CV-AC/Awesome-FaceDe-ID.

Explainable AI (XAI) in creative practice can be less about technocentric explanation and more about enabling artists to inspect modify and debug models as part of making Yet largescale texttoimage diffusion systems are typically presented as opaque endtoend tools limiting this kind of material engagement We argue that even large models can function as creative materials when their internal structure is made visible and manipulable To support this we propose a handson approach to explainability centred on experimentation and intervention We instantiate this approach with a model bending and an interactive (inspection) interface integrated into ComfyUIs nodebased workflow including interactive layer selection and intervention controls Through qualitative and quantitative analysis of bending interventions in Stable Diffusion 15 we show how manipulating specific components of a diffusion pipeline produces relatively consistent families of visual effects allowing artists to build practical layerlevel intuition about how different parts of the model shape generated images

Concept Bottleneck Models provide interpretable-by-design predictions by mediating diagnosis through human-understandable concepts, but in medical imaging, their trustworthiness is often limited by the quality and granularity of available supervision. In particular, predicted concept activations can be driven by irrelevant regions, leading to spatially unfaithful explanations. We study a data-centric spatially grounded Concept Bottleneck Model (SG-CBM) that leverages coarse lesion delineations as weak supervision to encourage anatomically plausible concept evidence. For breast ultrasound, we derive two clinically motivated zones from each lesion mask: (i) an in-lesion region of interest for morphology-related concepts and (ii) a posterior acoustic band for posterior phenomena. We train concept maps using a grouped spatial grounding objective and preserve semantic faithfulness with a linear bottleneck classifier. Across five-fold stratified group cross-validation, the proposed SG-CBM improves diagnostic AUROC and concept macro-AUROC while markedly increasing spatial alignment of concept evidence. We also perform a Train-corrupt/Test-clean annotation-quality stress test to quantify the impact of supervision quality on diagnosis and spatial faithfulness. Overall, the results underscore the need for data-quality-aware supervision design and systematic trustworthiness validation for deployable healthcare AI systems.

Frontier AI companies have published capability thresholds that differ substantially, making it difficult for third parties to verify whether a threshold has been crossed or to compare requirements across companies. Moreover, without common minimum thresholds, risk mitigation may be inconsistent, creating a potential race to the bottom in safety standards. We develop a methodology for deriving harmonized thresholds across three risk domains. For misuse risks (cyber and biological), we take expected harm as the key primitive and use an explicit risk-modeling approach that accounts for risk channels and model release conditions. For automated AI R&D, we base our proposed threshold on the observed rate of AI progress rather than expected harm. Our analysis expands upon prior work and highlights existing empirical gaps and limitations.

Canadian organizations deploying artificial intelligence systems face a fragmented regulatory landscape spanning federal requirements (the Treasury Board Directive on Automated Decision-Making) and divergent provincial regulations across Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, Manitoba, and British Columbia. The death of Bill C-27 (Artificial Intelligence and Data Act) in January 2025 - and the federal government's June 2026 confirmation that it will pursue targeted instruments rather than omnibus AI legislation - leaves organizations without unified compliance guidance. Global frameworks such as NIST AI RMF 1.0, the EU AI Act, and ISO/IEC 42001 provide valuable guidance but lack systematic methodologies for adaptation to multi-jurisdictional national contexts. We present SCITUS (Systematic Canadian Integration for Trustworthy and Unified Standards), a comprehensive framework adapting NIST AI RMF 1.0 to Canadian federal and provincial AI regulations simultaneously. SCITUS integrates seven trustworthy-AI characteristics enhanced for Canadian requirements, four core governance functions, a novel multi-jurisdictional compliance mapping methodology, and a versioned control catalog that has evolved from 31 controls (v1.0, June 2025) to 57 controls (v2.0, July 2026) in response to regulatory developments - including Canada's first regulatory findings on generative-AI training data - and the documented 2026 agentic-AI threat landscape. We demonstrate applicability through scenarios spanning federal government, provincial healthcare, and the private sector, and argue that systematic adaptation of NIST AI RMF to multi-jurisdictional requirements offers significant advantages over jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction compliance and provides a replicable model for other federal systems.

Annotation quality is a major bottleneck in building reliable and explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) systems for mental health research. In depression-related datasets, labels are often assigned without structured evidence, symptom-level justification, or traceable alignment with the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR), limiting both transparency and downstream model interpretability. We propose a self-evolving, expert-in-the-loop annotation framework for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) that combines large language model (LLM)-assisted labeling with expert verification. The framework is intended to support the construction of explainable, DSM-5-TR-aligned datasets rather than to perform clinical diagnosis. It operates in three stages: candidate evidence selection from textual records, criterion-level DSM-5-TR analysis, and case-level synthesis that produces label-level diagnostic and severity annotations. A dual-memory architecture, composed of Example Memory and Reflection Memory, is designed to internalize expert feedback and iteratively improve future annotations without retraining. We describe this mechanism and leave its evaluation across multiple feedback cycles to future work. In addition to final labels, the framework exports clinical evidence, reasoning traces, and edit histories, enabling comprehensive auditability. In a pilot study using expert-reviewed samples, the proposed approach improves annotation consistency and explainability while reducing manual revision effort.

Deepfake (DF) technology poses a significant threat to information integrity, driving the need for robust detection methods. Most DF detectors only consider predicting a binary label for whether the input is real or fake, lacking the justification required for real-world applications like legal proceedings. Explainable DF Detection has emerged to address this limitation, but existing techniques frequently fall short by either relying on human annotations for precise artifact localization or generating superficially plausible textual explanations without grounding. This work investigates the use of post-hoc explainable AI (XAI) to analyze the decision-making process of state-of-the-art black-box DF detectors. Specifically, we employ Encoding-Decoding Direction Pairs (EDDP), a technique suitable for uncovering the concept space of DF detectors (their semantic vocabulary) as well as the mechanism for writing and reading concept information to and from internal representations. Our analysis reveals previously hidden real and fake features learned implicitly during detector training, offering nuanced explanations unattainable through conventional methods. This enables global model understanding, spatially aware concept localization, and counterfactual what-if analysis, all contributing to a deeper comprehension of DF detection strategies.

We introduce institutional red-teaming, an evaluation methodology for testing deployment rules in multi-agent AI: hold the agents, objectives, and task state fixed, vary only one rule, and attribute the resulting change in collective behavior to that rule. We instantiate the methodology in IABench-CA, a consequence-allocation benchmark spanning 228 contexts, five canonical rules, and seven model populations (33,924 games), with a normative cooperative reference and auto-labelled reasoning traces. Three findings emerge. (1) Deployment rules causally alter collective safety: changing only the consequence rule moves mean fatality by 22 to 58 percentage points within every population. (2) There is no safe default, but the targeting hazard is universal: the safest rule, the least-safe rule, and even the direction of the incidence effect vary across populations, yet regressive identity-targeting is never decisively safest in any context for any population, eliminates the least-resourced agent in 30-87% of games everywhere, and is selection-unsafe relative to the cooperative reference for all seven populations. (3) Identity salience is the mechanism: a one-shot anonymization ablation on the most exploitation-prone population (gpt-5.1) shows that merely naming the loss bearer in the rule text drives targeted elimination from 22% to 81% at identical payoffs; under repeated play, anonymization only delays the targeting, as agents re-infer the hidden rule from observed eliminations. We package the methodology as a safety-case workflow that certifies a provisional rule region $Φ(c,P)$ per deployment context and population, with explicit residual risks and monitoring obligations.

Norm Enforcement for AI Agents: Robustly Shaping Behavior in Multi-Agent Systems

Yaowen Ye, Jacob Steinhardt

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

Regulating AI: Where U.S. State Policy and HCI (Mis)align

Nino Migineishvili, Alice Gao, Adinawa Adjagbodjou +3

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are increasingly adopted into everyday life, with most investment and development concentrated in the U.S. In response to rapid AI integration and scant federal guidelines, U.S. states have formed AI committees charged with studying AI-related societal trade-offs. We analyzed the 18 existing state-level AI committee reports to understand how policymakers discuss AI-related benefits and risks. We then compared the risks surfaced by policymakers to an established taxonomy of AI risks aggregated from literature and examined how policymakers' concerns align, or misalign, from those of HCI scholars. These insights provide important mileposts for shaping currently ongoing policy initiatives and future research. Our findings reveal important gaps: while committees invoke responsible AI, their framings often omit broader socio-technical concerns emphasized in HCI. We discuss opportunities for HCI to support socio-technical perspectives, employ participatory design, and close the gap between research and policy.

We present HaloGuard 1.0, an open-weights implementation of the constitutional-classifier paradigm for input safety. It achieves state-of-the-art performance on English and multilingual prompt-safety benchmarks at roughly one-tenth the model size of current leading open guard models. The safety constitution is the organising structure of the corpus: a natural-language constitution of 46 policies and 2,940 subcategories drives synthetic data generation, with exhaustive one-to-one paired counterfactuals that hold topic and vocabulary fixed while flipping intent, a two-tier harmless design that separately targets boundary and baseline false positives (FPs), and balanced multilingual materialisation across 46 languages that treats language as a surface form appearing on both sides of the boundary rather than as an adversarial signal. Across seven prompt-safety benchmarks, HaloGuard 1.0-0.8B attains the best average F1 (90.9) of any open guard we evaluate, outperforming baselines up to 27B parameters (over 30 times larger) while holding false-positive rate (FPR) to 4.3 and false-negative rate (FNR) to 9.5. The HaloGuard 1.0-4B variant reaches average F1 of 92.1 and FPR of 3.5, spending its extra capacity on precision rather than recall. A structured adjudication of the remaining failures indicates that most apparent missed-harm cases are benchmark mislabels rather than genuine model misses. An always-on adversarial red-teaming protocol continuously hardens the guard against both content-level and agentic attacks. We release the models as open weights.

Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, or misreported progress in an agentic task. Existing benchmarks compress these into pass/fail labels, obscuring whether failures reflect capability limits, policy ambiguity, instruction conflict, scaffold failure, or unstable evaluator judgments. Adversarial pragmatics is safety-relevant model behaviour under instruction conflict, embedded commands, quotation, scope ambiguity, deixis, and indirect speech acts. It's designed to extend to multi-turn agent transcripts, but the seed set represents that family with a single-turn tool-result contrast. This paper introduces a diagnostic framework, an 18-item seed benchmark, a 54-row pilot, and a six-cell LLM-judge assessment, with a protocol keeping task success, policy compliance, risk, refusal, attribution, and confidence analytically separate. The benchmark separates four inference targets a single label can conceal: the regime-relative reference, configured-system behaviour, evaluator-output interpretation, and taxonomic assignment. Its intended use is diagnosis, not deployment certification, vendor ranking, or a general safety score. A first LLM judge that graded its own outputs with the expected answer visible missed the safety-relevant minority classes. Item-clustered intervals leave four of six chance-corrected agreement statistics unable to rule out a constant labeller, and hierarchical pooling shrinks the one eye-catching rubric effect toward the group mean and widens its interval through zero. Rejudging the objects across three judge models and two information conditions leaves the pattern intact: no cell recovers more than two of eleven partial successes, and the strongest cell's edge comes partly from never using that label.