Responsible AI research from arXiv, ranked by citations from
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Allen AI ), and enriched with key takeaways
3,349 papers in 1 topic
Hannah Cha
Personalized, generative AI systems increasingly adapt their behavior to individual users over time, fundamentally changing model behavior. While existing auditing approaches have been effective at surfacing harms in non-personalized contexts, they often rely on static, simulated evaluations and definitions of harm that aggregate across broad, group categories. In this position paper, we argue that such approaches can fail to capture emergent harms in personalized generative AI systems, where harms surface through interpretations of ongoing interaction and evolve with user history. We identify three presuppositions underlying many harm auditing paradigms: that harms can be (1) specified outside real-world interaction, (2) defined non-pluralistically within groups, and (3) treated as static. One might argue that personalized systems could simply learn definitions of what constitutes harm to individual users through repeated interactions. However, we argue that attempts to surface user harms through deeper personalization risk imposing asymmetric burdens of labor and privacy on marginalized users. Consequently, we propose reframing understandings of harm as adaptive, user- and community-centered processes, and outline design directions that shift auditing from retrospective evaluation toward infrastructures that support ongoing articulation of harm in interaction. Our work highlights the need for auditing and design practices that better reflect the pluralistic and evolving nature of harm understanding in personalized generative AI systems.
Ananth Shreekumar, Jyun-Jhu Syu, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen +2
Deep learning models have become integral to security applications due to their ability to model complex relationships in data and detect sophisticated threats. However, their complexity makes it difficult to understand how predictions are generated, posing significant challenges for interpretability, particularly in security applications where transparency is critical. Existing explanation methods, such as visual explanation techniques and post-hoc approaches, suffer from several limitations: reduced faithfulness due to local approximation errors, instability caused by reliance on randomness, and computational inefficiency that hinders real-time usage. To address these issues, we introduce XSec, a self-explainable deep architecture developed for security applications. During training, XSec uses a novel mask-based approach to extract informative sub-features from the data and learns prototypes, representative patterns that characterize each class. XSec then leverages the prototypes in a dedicated similarity layer at test time to compute similarity scores and generates interpretable explanations without the need for post-hoc analysis. We evaluate XSec across five diverse security scenarios, demonstrating its ability to achieve an average classification accuracy of 97.33% with minimal performance compromise. XSec produces deterministic explanations for a fixed trained model and input and substantially reduces explanation latency compared with approximation-based and perturbation-based post-hoc methods. Through this effort, we extend the applicability of self-explainable AI to security applications, bridging the gap between deep learning performance and the need for explainability in critical scenarios.
Nimisha Karnatak, Max Van Kleek, Nigel Shadbolt
Generative AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes professional contexts, where their outputs shape what users believe, how they reason, and what they treat as settled. This raises a central question for responsible AI: under what conditions is reliance on generative AI outputs epistemically warranted rather than behaviourally induced? Existing frameworks largely ask whether AI outputs are accurate, fair, explainable, safe, or trusted by users. These questions remain necessary, and each can contribute to warranted reliance. However, they do not directly specify warranted reliance as a distinct evaluative target: the conditions under which users are justified in treating AI outputs as inputs into their own reasoning. We argue that this requires an account of epistemic trustworthiness: what makes a system epistemically worthy of reliance. Drawing on philosophical accounts of trustworthiness as competence and audience-orientation, we develop a constitutive normative framework comprising three jointly necessary and non-fungible conditions. First, epistemic humility requires systems to represent and communicate the limits of their competence. Second, epistemic access requires systems to enable users to inspect, question, and contest outputs in context. Third, resistance to epistemic injustice requires systems to recognise users as legitimate epistemic agents and avoid marginalising their knowledge and experience. Through real-world case analyses in legal reasoning, medical reasoning, and hiring, we show how failures of epistemic humility, epistemic access, and resistance to epistemic injustice can produce consequential harms that standard measures of accuracy, fairness, and usability do not address on their own. We conclude by outlining design and evaluation implications for GenAI systems organised around epistemically warranted reliance rather than output correctness alone.
Jessica Y. Bo, Paula Akemi Aoyagui, Shalaleh Rismani +3
Safety risks of AI are becoming increasingly evident in human interactions with AI technologies. The prominent approaches to evaluating these risks favor technical methods, such as model benchmarks and LLM simulations, often sidelining empirical research with human subjects. To examine this apparent gap in the acceptance of human research, we conduct an expert survey (n=93) and expert interviews (n=17) with AI Safety & Ethics (AISE) researchers from Technical, Sociotechnical, Governance, and Normative backgrounds. Our findings suggest that although there is a consensus that human research is valuable for generating evidence for AISE, its adoption and acceptance are constrained by perceived validity issues, tangible resource barriers, epistemic and personal preferences in methods, and infrastructural constraints from the broader research community. In particular, Technical researchers tend to value human research less and collaborate across disciplines less, suggesting an epistemic tension towards human methods. We propose recommendations for establishing the epistemic fit of human research within AISE and bridging the prohibitive limitations that researchers face, while avoiding performative 'human-washing'.
George Grispos, Sajda Qureshi
The use of e-commerce mobile applications is expanding in Nigeria, creating both opportunities and risks, including fraud and reduced user control over digital technologies, raising concerns about digital sovereignty. This research examines how Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Nigerian mobile applications affects digital sovereignty, examined through platform transparency as a key indicator of user awareness and control. Using an interpretive approach, the research combines the forensic analysis of selected Android applications with contextual document analysis to identify AI features and evaluate disclosure practices. The findings show that AI is widely implemented in the applications, yet transparency about its use remains limited. A socio-economic analysis of Nigeria further shows an increasing dependence on consumer digital platforms, moderate AI awareness, and uneven patterns of interaction. By providing empirical evidence on AI transparency and platform practices, this study advances understanding of individual digital sovereignty and highlights challenges for protecting user control in AI-driven digital environments.
Soorya Ram Shimgekar, Michelle Hu, Dorisa Shehi +10
Electronic health record (EHR) feature engineering is a major bottleneck in clinical research and AI, accounting for 39-45% of data scientists' workload. This is especially pronounced in heart failure, which affects an estimated 6.7 million U.S. adults and requires integrating fragmented EHR data with disease-specific, guideline-based clinical reasoning. Existing rule-based and large language model (LLM)-based approaches offer only partial automation with limited maintainability and evidence traceability. We developed the Nimblemind Multi-Agent System (nMAS), an evidence-linked, rubric-grounded pipeline for automated heart-failure feature engineering, and evaluated it on 500 dummy patient records from nine EHR source tables. nMAS generated 132 structured and 70 rubric-scored aggregated features, verified for structural integrity, rubric compliance, and provenance, and audited by a restricted LLM. Adding the aggregated features improved held-out AUROC from 0.895 to 0.963 for HFrEF and 0.870 to 0.910 for HFpEF phenotyping, and an independent LLM-based rubric assessment of evidence support and methodological soundness scored the features at 81.5% of maximum points. These results demonstrate the feasibility of automated, auditable feature engineering for complex cardiovascular EHR data, though evaluation was limited to a single-institution cohort and external validation is needed.
Leah Davis, Dominic Martin, AJung Moon
As AI systems become increasingly integrated into diverse interfaces and applications, model-centric audits are insufficient to address risks arising from interactions among system components and deployment environments. System integration has long been central to software audits in safety-critical domains such as aerospace. However, its role in AI auditing remains underexplored. Scanning through 4,259 documents, we present a scoping review of AI audits that treat system integration as a core tenet of evaluation (n = 58). Using reflexive thematic analysis, we analyze their elements, actors, enablers, and constraints. We find that the corpus represents an emerging yet still fragmented form of AI auditing: few existing measures target integration-specific risks; large gaps remain in meeting traditional audit expectations; and access to necessary information and resources significantly influences audit design. Nonetheless, integration can be categorized across three sites (inter-component, system-environment, and multi-system), each serving the functions of risk exploration, risk determination, coordination, and procedural regularity. Deviating from other types of evaluations, these audits assess qualities specific to system integration, including compatibility, completeness, and oversight. This review calls on the AI community to prioritize system integration as a core strategy for addressing AI risk, and to develop audit practices capable of capturing failures across components, environments, and systems beyond the reach of component-level evaluation.
Filip Naudot, Arunavo Ganguly, Timotheus Kampik +2
Power indices, originating in cooperative game theory, quantify each player's influence on the outcome of a given game. Originally designed to distribute profits or costs among players and to analyse the fairness of voting systems, power indices have recently gained prominence as methods for attributing outputs of AI-based systems to inputs, thus facilitating explainability. However, selecting the appropriate power index for a given explanation task is an understudied problem. To address this, we organise power indices along three attribution dimensions: single-player, set-based, and cardinality-based. For each dimension, we review the corresponding power indices, generalise existing ones where applicable, and analyse which formal principles they satisfy. We provide proofs for properties that are missing in the literature and show that moving to the cardinality-based setting removes player-identity information while preserving some index-level distinctions. Using concrete examples, we illustrate how the choice of dimension and index affects the resulting attributions in practice, and offer guidance for practitioners seeking to select a suitable power index for a given application context.
Ethan Dickey
As generative AI permeates computing instruction, the emergent design challenge is to configure each tool's pedagogical role, authority, and accountability for the instructional work it performs. We argue for instructional governance by design: governance should be encoded in a teaching tool's interaction model, constraints, and workflow. We introduce a multidimensional framework that characterizes AI teaching tools through (1) pedagogical grounding, (2) AI instructional authority, (3) human accountability and control, (4) learner agency and cognitive engagement, (5) context specificity and boundary setting, and (6) evaluation visibility and revision. These dimensions yield governance profiles that help educators align tools with specific purposes and educational stakes. We develop the position through a comparative analysis of a portfolio of AI teaching tools across computing and first-year engineering: rubric-anchored GTA simulations, reflection-oriented code companions, staff-reviewed forum-response systems, TA-supervised diagram generators, and course-specific code-style coaches. These cases show how common instructional functions call for different combinations of rubrics, learning-theory commitments, approval gates, supervision, and course-specific constraints. We further apply the framework to selected published tools to demonstrate its use beyond a single institutional portfolio. From these cases, we identify reusable design questions for aligning governance with instructional stakes, human capacity, and intended learning processes. This position reframes responsible AI integration as a curricular and interaction-design challenge and offers a common vocabulary for tool builders, instructors, and researchers to design, compare, and evaluate AI-mediated learning environments.
Anna Verheyden, Yizhe Zhang, Robin De Croon +2
Fairness metric selection is typically left to data scientists, but which biases are problematic and which metric captures them best depends on stakeholders' experience and domain knowledge. This calls for involving non-technical stakeholders, but the research prototypes built for this purpose so far have not tested whether these stakeholders form accurate mental models of the metrics they interact with or can act on them to identify biases. We present FairAware, a fairness assessment tool co-designed with Human Resources (HR) domain experts. We evaluate stakeholders' understanding through a mixed-methods study with 70 participants (35 HR employees, 35 job seekers), measuring objective and subjective understanding, cognitive load, bias identification accuracy, and open-ended feedback. Most participants correctly identified the most disadvantaged group, with task duration being the only significant predictor. We also found a gap between subjective and objective understanding, with both groups performing similarly across all measures. These results suggest that fairness assessment tools for non-experts are usable for identifying biases but need built-in checks on understanding before stakeholders make higher-stakes decisions.
Saqib Shouqi, Abdullah Nazly, Januki Wanniarachchi +1
Role-Playing Language Agents (RPLAs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes applications such as healthcare assistance, customer support, and education, where maintaining consistent personas, ethical constraints, and behavioral coherence under adversarial pressure is critical. Existing evaluation approaches rely on static benchmarks or isolated single-turn prompts that fail to capture cumulative behavioral failures emerging over extended interactions. We present a modular multi-agent platform for adversarially stress-testing RPLAs through structured, multi-turn dialogue. The system coordinates three agents: a strategy-driven Interrogator Agent that applies six progressive adversarial strategies, a Target Agent representing the RPLA under evaluation, and an automated Judging Agent that scores behavior across role fidelity, drift, ethical deviation, and consistency dimensions. Through experiments across three personas and three LLM families, we demonstrate that multi-strategy adversarial evaluation reveals failure modes invisible to single-strategy testing, reducing overall robustness scores by 0.17--0.20 points on average. Cross-model validation confirms consistent degradation patterns across Llama-3.3-70B, GPT-4o-mini, and Claude-3.5-Haiku, with Authority Challenge and Emotional Manipulation emerging as the most effective attack strategies. Automated judging achieves strong human alignment ($r = 0.82$, Fleiss' $κ= 0.71$). This work is released as an open-source platform to support AI safety and reproducible RPLA benchmarking. While the framework enables systematic discovery of failure modes, we acknowledge potential ethical risks associated with adversarial testing methodologies and emphasize responsible usage for improving AI safety.
Jannick Strobel, Muqsit Azeem, Stefan Leue
Explaining the predictions of neural networks is a central challenge in trustworthy AI. Existing explanation methods, such as those based on feature attribution or minimal sufficient sets, typically treat input features as independent, which can yield misleading explanations when inputs exhibit structured dependencies. We address this by formalizing explanations as Halpern-Pearl (HP) actual causes, modeling input dependencies using Boolean Structural Causal Models (SCMs). We compute HP causes by applying bound propagation and branch-and-bound techniques, while providing formal guarantees of completeness and minimality. Our experiments show that we substantially outperform brute-force and ILP baselines in scalability, and outperform heuristic search as graph size grows, computing all minimal actual causes on instances with search spaces of up to $2.3\times10^{13}$ candidate (cause, contingency) pairs, on SCMs with up to 28 nodes, within a 180s per-instance budget. In a case study, we further show that ignoring input dependencies inflates the number of reported causes, 14.9% of which are spurious under our SCM.
74% published 2023+
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