Research Papers

Deep learning (DL) has been widely studied for assisting applications of modern wireless communications. One of the applications is automatic modulation classification (AMC). However, DL models are found to be vulnerable to adversarial machine learning (AML) threats. One of the most persistent and stealthy threats is the backdoor (Trojan) attack. Nevertheless, most studied threats originate from other AI domains, such as computer vision (CV). Therefore, in this paper, a physical backdoor attack targeting the wireless signal before transmission is studied. The adversary is considered to be using explainable AI (XAI) to guide the placement of the trigger in the most vulnerable parts of the signal. Then, a class prototype combined with principal components is used to generate the trigger. The studied threat was found to be efficient in breaching multiple DL-based AMC models. The attack achieves high success rates for a wide range of SNR values and a small poisoning ratio.

Trustworthy artificial intelligence increasingly relies on probabilistic computation to achieve robustness, interpretability, security and privacy. In practical systems, such workloads interleave deterministic data access with repeated stochastic sampling across models, data paths and system functions, shifting performance bottlenecks from arithmetic units to memory systems that must deliver both data and randomness. Here we present a unified data-access perspective in which deterministic access is treated as a limiting case of stochastic sampling, enabling both modes to be analyzed within a common framework. This view reveals that increasing stochastic demand reduces effective data-access efficiency and can drive systems into entropy-limited operation. Based on this insight, we define memory-level evaluation criteria, including unified operation, distribution programmability, efficiency, robustness to hardware non-idealities and parallel compatibility. Using these criteria, we analyze limitations of conventional architectures and examine emerging probabilistic compute-in-memory approaches that integrate sampling with memory access, outlining pathways toward scalable hardware for trustworthy AI.

Responsible AI initiatives place great emphasis on the safety of Large Language Model (LLM)-based systems. In particular, it has become standard practice to subject these models to an alignment procedure aimed at preventing harmful outputs. However, once aligned, a model is not guaranteed to maintain this alignment throughout its lifecycle. Moreover, the likelihood of misalignment increases as malicious actors may deliberately employ jailbreaking techniques to compromise LLM safety. To counter this, much research has focused on improving alignment methods and post-processing filters. In this paper, we introduce a new perspective on advancing LLM alignment: rather than developing stronger alignment techniques, we investigate the model's intrinsic ability to recover its alignment after corruption. We propose a methodology for modeling the safety trajectories of user-assistant interactions and for detecting recovery trends within them. We apply this approach to a jailbreaking scenario, presenting a preliminary recovery analysis based on a dataset of adversarial multi-turn dialogues and examining the influence of the content moderation model chosen for safety evaluation. Project page with an interactive data visualizer is available at https://lab-rococo-sapienza.github.io/LearningfromMistakes.

The safety of autonomous AI agents is increasingly recognized as a critical open problem. As agents transition from passive text generators to active actors capable of executing shell commands, modifying files, calling APIs, and browsing the web, the consequences of unsafe or adversarially manipulated behavior become immediate and tangible. Existing AI safety work has focused primarily on model alignment and input filtering, but these approaches do not address what happens at the moment an agent's intent becomes a real action on a real machine. This gap is especially acute in local environments, where developers run agents against their own filesystems, credentials, and infrastructure with little runtime control. This paper introduces AgentWall, a runtime safety and observability layer for local AI agents. AgentWall intercepts every proposed agent action before it reaches the host environment, evaluates it against an explicit declarative policy, requires human approval for sensitive operations, and records a complete execution trail for audit and replay. It is implemented as a policy-enforcing MCP proxy and native OpenClaw plugin, working across Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, and OpenClaw with a single install command. We present the design, architecture, threat model, and policy model of AgentWall, and demonstrate 92.9% policy enforcement accuracy with sub-millisecond overhead across 14 benchmark tests. AgentWall is open-source at https://github.com/agentwall/Agentwall.

An autonomous AI ecosystem (SUBSTRATE S3), generating product specifications without explicit instructions about formal methods, independently proposed the use of Z3 SMT solver across six distinct domains of AI safety: verification of LLM-generated code, tool API safety for AI agents, post-distillation reasoning correctness, CLI command validation, hardware assembly verification, and smart contract safety. These convergent discoveries, occurring across 8 products over 13 days with Jaccard similarity below 15% between variants, suggest that formal verification is not merely a useful technique for AI safety but an emergent property of any sufficiently complex system reasoning about its own safety. We propose a unified framework (substrate-guard) that applies Z3-based verification across all six output classes through a common API, and evaluate it on 181 test cases across five implemented domains, achieving 100% classification accuracy with zero false positives and zero false negatives. Our framework detected real bugs that empirical testing would miss, including an INT_MIN overflow in branchless RISC-V assembly and mathematically proved that unconstrained string parameters in tool APIs are formally unverifiable.

Robust semantic segmentation is crucial for safe autonomous driving, yet deployed models remain vulnerable to black-box adversarial attacks when target weights are unknown. Most existing approaches either craft image-wide perturbations or optimize patches for a single architecture, which limits their practicality and transferability. We introduce OmniPatch, a training framework for learning a universal adversarial patch that generalizes across images and both ViT and CNN architectures without requiring access to target model parameters.

This article introduces and substantiates the concept of Neuro-Linguistic Integration (NLI), a novel paradigm for human-technology interaction where Large Language Models (LLMs) act as a key semantic interface between raw neural data and their social application. We analyse the dual nature of LLMs in this role: as tools that augment human capabilities in communication, medicine, and education, and as sources of unprecedented ethical risks to mental autonomy and neurorights. By synthesizing insights from AI ethics, neuroethics, and the philosophy of technology, the article critiques the inherent limitations of LLMs as semantic mediators, highlighting core challenges such as the erosion of agency in translation, threats to mental integrity through precision semantic suggestion, and the emergence of a new `neuro-linguistic divide' as a form of biosemantic inequality. Moving beyond a critique of existing regulatory models (e.g., GDPR, EU AI Act), which fail to address the dynamic, meaning-making processes of NLI, we propose a foundational framework for proactive governance. This framework is built on the principles of Semantic Transparency, Mental Informed Consent, and Agency Preservation, supported by practical tools such as NLI-specific ethics sandboxes, bias-aware certification of LLMs, and legal recognition of the neuro-linguistic inference. The article argues for the development of a `second-order neuroethics,' focused not merely on neural data protection but on the ethics of AI-mediated semantic interpretation itself, thereby providing a crucial conceptual basis for steering the responsible development of neuro-digital ecosystems.

The nature of personalized text-to-image models poses a unique safety challenge that generic context-blind methods are ill-equipped to handle. Such global filters create a dilemma: to prevent misuse, they are forced to damage the model's broader utility by erasing concepts entirely, causing unacceptable collateral damage.Our work presents a more precisely targeted approach, built on the principle that security should be as context-aware as the threat itself, intrinsically bound to the personalized concept. We present IDENTITYGUARD, which realizes this principle through a conditional restriction that blocks harmful content only when combined with the personalized identity, and a concept-specific watermark for precise traceability. Experiments show our approach prevents misuse while preserving the model's utility and enabling robust traceability. By moving beyond blunt, global filters, our work demonstrates a more effective and responsible path toward AI safety.

The recent escalation of the Iran Israel USA conflict in 2026 has triggered widespread global discussions across social media platforms. As people increasingly use these platforms for expressing opinions, analyzing public sentiment from these discussions can provide valuable insights into global public perception. This study aims to analyze global public sentiment regarding the Iran Israel USA conflict by mining user-generated comments from YouTube news channels. The work contributes to public opinion analysis by introducing a privacy preserving framework that combines topic wise sentiment analysis with modern deep learning techniques and Federated Learning. To achieve this, approximately 19,000 YouTube comments were collected from major international news channels and preprocessed to remove noise and normalize text. Sentiment labels were initially generated using the VADER sentiment analyzer and later validated through manual inspection to improve reliability. Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) was applied to identify key discussion topics related to the conflict. Several transformer-based models, including BERT, RoBERTa, XLNet, DistilBERT, ModernBERT, and ELECTRA, were fine tuned for sentiment classification. The best-performing model was further integrated into a federated learning environment to enable distributed training by preserving user data privacy. Additionally, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) techniques using SHAP were applied to interpret model predictions and identify influential words affecting sentiment classification. Experimental results demonstrate that transformer models perform effectively, and among them, ELECTRA achieved the best performance with 91.32% accuracy. The federated learning also maintained strong performance while preserving privacy, achieving 89.59% accuracy in a two client configuration.

Backdoor4Good: Benchmarking Beneficial Uses of Backdoors in LLMs

Yige Li, Wei Zhao, Zhe Li +6

Backdoor mechanisms have traditionally been studied as security threats that compromise the integrity of machine learning models. However, the same mechanism -- the conditional activation of specific behaviors through input triggers -- can also serve as a controllable and auditable interface for trustworthy model behavior. In this work, we present \textbf{Backdoor4Good (B4G)}, a unified benchmark and framework for \textit{beneficial backdoor} applications in large language models (LLMs). Unlike conventional backdoor studies focused on attacks and defenses, B4G repurposes backdoor conditioning for Beneficial Tasks that enhance safety, controllability, and accountability. It formalizes beneficial backdoor learning under a triplet formulation $(T, A, U)$, representing the \emph{Trigger}, \emph{Activation mechanism}, and \emph{Utility function}, and implements a benchmark covering four trust-centric applications. Through extensive experiments across Llama3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Llama2-13B, we show that beneficial backdoors can achieve high controllability, tamper-resistance, and stealthiness while preserving clean-task performance. Our findings demonstrate new insights that backdoors need not be inherently malicious; when properly designed, they can serve as modular, interpretable, and beneficial building blocks for trustworthy AI systems. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM/B4G.

Federated Graph Learning (FedGL) is vulnerable to malicious attacks, yet developing a truly effective and stealthy attack method remains a significant challenge. Existing attack methods suffer from low attack success rates, high computational costs, and are easily identified and smoothed by defense algorithms. To address these challenges, we propose \textbf{FedShift}, a novel two-stage "Hide and Find" distributed adversarial attack. In the first stage, before FedGL begins, we inject a learnable and hidden "shifter" into part of the training data, which subtly pushes poisoned graph representations toward a target class's decision boundary without crossing it, ensuring attack stealthiness during training. In the second stage, after FedGL is complete, we leverage the global model information and use the hidden shifter as an optimization starting point to efficiently find the adversarial perturbations. During the final attack, we aggregate these perturbations from multiple malicious clients to form the final effective adversarial sample and trigger the attack. Extensive experiments on six large-scale datasets demonstrate that our method achieves the highest attack effectiveness compared to existing advanced attack methods. In particular, our attack can effectively evade 3 mainstream robust federated learning defense algorithms and converges with a time cost reduction of over 90\%, highlighting its exceptional stealthiness, robustness, and efficiency.

While diffusion models have revolutionized visual content generation, their rapid adoption has underscored the critical need to investigate vulnerabilities, e.g., to backdoor attacks. In multimodal diffusion models, it is natural to expect that attacking multiple modalities simultaneously (e.g., text and image) would yield complementary effects and strengthen the overall backdoor. In this paper, we challenge this assumption by investigating the phenomenon of Backdoor Modality Collapse, a scenario where the backdoor mechanism degenerates to rely predominantly on a subset of modalities, rendering others redundant. To rigorously quantify this behavior, we introduce two novel metrics: Trigger Modality Attribution (TMA) and Cross-Trigger Interaction (CTI). Through extensive experiments across diverse training configurations in multimodal conditional diffusion, we consistently observe a ``winner-takes-all'' dynamic in backdoor behavior. Our results reveal that (1) attacks often collapse into subset-modality dominance, and (2) cross-modal interaction is negligible or even negative, contradicting the intuition of synergistic vulnerability. These findings highlight a critical blind spot in current assessments, suggesting that high attack success rates often mask a fundamental reliance on a subset of modalities. This establishes a principled foundation for mechanistic analysis and future defense development.