Responsible AI research from arXiv, ranked by citations from
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Allen AI ), and enriched with key takeaways
6,810 papers
Chenguang Wang, Ming Li, Chengrui Fan +4
AI reviewers can assign different judgments to manuscripts that report the same science in different wording, potentially rewarding rhetorical optimization over scientific improvement. We formulate Rhetorical Robustness as the joint requirement of stability across content-preserving rewrites and discrimination across papers. We introduce RobustReview, a controlled full-manuscript benchmark with 1,260 manuscript versions, and evaluate 30 reviewer configurations. The benchmark reveals false robustness, where low rewrite sensitivity coincides with score collapse across papers, and shows that human alignment and rhetorical robustness rank reviewers differently. Moreover, the evaluated content-focused prompting protocol does not consistently improve robustness across backbones. Motivated by these findings, we introduce SciCore, a dual-branch reviewer that averages a full-manuscript judgment with a judgment based on an extracted, structured science core. This design combines manuscript-level assessment with a content-normalized view intended to reduce rhetorical sensitivity. In our primary GPT-5.5 comparison, SciCore achieves a leading joint stability-discrimination profile among the benchmarked reviewers while maintaining competitive human alignment. These results identify rhetorical robustness as a distinct evaluation target and demonstrate the potential of science-core review to improve it.
David Schmotz, Derck Prinzhorn, Luca Beurer-Kellner +3
A central concern in AI safety is that agents may treat oversight as an obstacle when it conflicts with completing their goals. We study instrumental evasion, the propensity of LLM agents to circumvent runtime monitoring as a means of completing ordinary tasks. We introduce EvasionBench, a benchmark of 50 diverse task-policy pairs in which completing the task requires an operation prohibited by a runtime monitor. Agents know that their tool calls are monitored and are prompted to continue working when they pause. Across our evaluations, best-of-3 evasion attempt rates reach up to 98% and success rates up to 88%, with substantial variance across models. Claude Fable 5.1 succeeds less often, but frequently makes creative attempts to circumvent the monitor. Evasion generally increases with test-time compute, with higher evasion rates at greater reasoning effort and token use. Traces show that agents encode prohibited commands, decompose operations across tool calls, and retry until relevant context leaves the monitor's history. We also find that GPT-6 Astra's low evasion rate comes with overrefusal, as it frequently abandons otherwise solvable tasks under a denial-of-service prompt injection. Our findings show that ordinary task pressure can lead to adaptive attempts to evade runtime monitors without an explicit adversarial objective. Effective oversight must therefore remain robust against repeated attempts, as the persistence that helps agents solve difficult tasks can also drive them to circumvent their guardrails.
Veronika Batzdorfer, Carlo Romano Marcello Alessandro Santagiustina
High annotation reproducibility does not necessarily imply that an LLM-inferred measure captures the construct it is intended to measure. We test this distinction using a dataset from the European Commission's AI Act consultation, linking structured survey responses to free-text consultation submissions from the same stakeholders. LLM annotations of consultation submissions are highly reproducible (intraclass correlations > 0.99), yet show limited convergence with survey-reported measures of the nominal construct they were intended to approximate. Divergence between survey-and LLM-inferred text-based measures varies systematically across stakeholder groups: business associations express greater concern about AI risks in text-based consultations than in survey responses ({g} = +1.0), whereas public authorities and several nonbusiness groups show smaller or negative divergences. Divergences between scores suggest positive spatial autocorrelation across European countries (Moran's I = 0.347, p = 0.036), indicating that stakeholders from neighboring countries tend toward more similar text-based stances towards AI safety concerns. Despite divergence, survey-reported concerns remain strongly associated with support for explainability across all divergence levels. These results demonstrate that LLM annotation reproducibility can coexist with poor construct correspondence and motivate validation procedures that distinguish reproducibility, construct validity, and communication context variation when LLMs are used as measurement instruments.
Lionel Levine
Artificial intelligence threatens to outrun human understanding and control. New mathematics is needed to design AI that is legible, steerable, and cooperative with humanity. I organize this invitation by mathematical field, so you can turn straight to your own: logic and game theory for cooperation; probability for agency and world-models; algebra and representation theory for learned features; analysis and geometry for generalization and training dynamics. Each section ends with an open problem that is accessible to a working mathematician with no prior experience in AI safety.
Damilola Popoola, Souradeep Bhattacharya, Manimaran Govindarasu
The rapid growth of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) has significantly expanded the cyber attack surface of modern power grids. Furthermore, increasing sophistication in attack techniques demands anomaly detection systems (ADS) that are accurate, interpretable, and reliable to support DER cybersecurity. While ML-based ADS provide strong detection capabilities, their black-box nature reduces operator trust and limits Security Operation Center's (SOC) ability to effectively interpret alerts and respond, highlighting the need for explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) to ensure transparency and operational confidence. This paper presents an XAI-based anomaly detection framework tailored for DER networks (ExCYDER). The proposed framework uses a self-verifying mechanism that validates ADS alerts to ensure trustworthy decision-making. ExCYDER combines LightGBM with SHAP to check whether each model decision aligns with its feature-attribution evidence, allowing the system to confirm that its internal reasoning is consistent and reliable. Experiments on a realistic DNP3 dataset achieved over 98% detection accuracy, an average rule--SHAP consistency of 44.6%, a SHAP latency of 14.5 ms per alert, and a confidence deviation within 5%, demonstrating stable verification behavior with minimal computational overhead. The framework distinguished between coherent and inconsistent alerts without compromising detection accuracy, demonstrating that integrated verification within XAI-based ADS enhances interpretability, auditability, and operational robustness for DER-focused SOCs.
Qinghua Lu, Yoshua Bengio
Incidents show that AI safety failures often arise across multiple layers. We present a safety-by-design assurance architecture combining model-level supervision, such as Scientist AI, with system-level controls over scaffolds and harnesses, independent verification, monitoring, and evidence infrastructure, supported by governance for accountability and evidence interoperability.
Rohan Sinha, Anushri Dixit, Ran Tian +2
Generalist robots promise to transform our society: the same system that prepares a meal or folds laundry might also repair a car, inspect infrastructure, or care for a loved one. Yet this versatility introduces risks far beyond the collision- and force-based safety notions that have long dominated robotics. Notions of safety must now consider context (e.g., turning off a building's electricity is only safe during scheduled maintenance), user intent (e.g., asking the robot to ``clean the kitchen'' includes unspoken expectations that the robot should not mix dangerous but powerful cleaning agents like bleach and ammonia), hard-to-model physical consequences (e.g., burning food during meal preparation), and more. We argue the need for a new era of robot safety---embodied AI safety---that broadens the hazards considered across the robot's lifecycle while recognizing that the safety of bits cannot be separated from the safety of atoms. We present a taxonomy of emerging risks and a full-stack research agenda to guide the safe deployment of generalist robots.
Ziming Wang, Changwu Huang, Ke Tang +2
Interpretability and fairness are two of the most emphasized dimensions in trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI). Various explainable AI methods have been introduced to improve interpretability. This paper focuses on neural network (NN)-based generalized additive models (GAMs), a class of self-interpretable models. While most existing research has prioritized improving the accuracy of NN-based GAMs, their interpretability remains largely underexplored. To address this gap, this paper introduces explicit quantitative metrics for evaluating the interpretability of NN-based GAMs, empirically examines their effectiveness, and explores strategies for improving interpretability within these models. In addition, the simultaneous and explicit optimization of both interpretability and fairness, along with their trade-offs and the underlying reasons, remains underexplored. To address this, we propose a multi-objective neural basis model (MONBM) framework based on multi-objective evolutionary learning to consider accuracy, interpretability, and fairness simultaneously. A partial retraining strategy is further developed to facilitate the practical application of evolutionary multi-objective optimization to deep model architectures. Based on MONBM, this paper reveals the complex relationships between these dimensions and the reasons behind these intricate relationships. This analysis demonstrates how multi-objective optimization can be combined with self-interpretable models to reveal relationships among trustworthiness objectives. In addition, MONBM obtains a set of models with different trade-offs between dimensions, and the competitiveness of the approach is validated by comparing it with state-of-the-art methods.
Daan R. Henselmans, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Arno Libert
AI oversight methods rely on ground truth for validation, but what constitutes appropriate AI behavior is contested. This leaves evaluation of moral reasoning in LLMs and debate-based oversight implicitly avoiding realistic ambiguity. We investigate an alternative standard designed to function despite such ambiguity: structural quality of the defence a model can mount for its verdicts in response to critical questions, measured through a four-phase dialectical protocol grounded in Walton's theory of argumentation schemes and Govier's criteria for argument cogency. The protocol is adaptive to different frames of reasoning, extends beyond multiple-choice framing, and treats both the reasoning that precedes a verdict and its post-hoc justification. Across nine frontier models and 200 high-ambiguity MoralChoice items -- $6,778$ judge-scored cells, validated against $89.6\%$ inter-judge agreement on the binary failure judgment -- models defend their reasoning well above the rubric minimum on every dimension. Failure mass concentrates on grounds and sufficiency, and correlates with epistemic hedging rather than argument length. Reasoning is better defended than post-hoc justification, on every model and every Govier dimension. The scheme a model presents in its justification differs from the one it reasoned with on a substantial share of dilemmas ($\geq 20\%$ per model), despite value-based practical reasoning dominating both tracks. The protocol catches strictly indefensible defences (self-contradiction, false premises), and it surfaces difficulties in characterizing the role of retraction in AI alignment, suggesting a need for more situated evaluations.
Ahmed El Kady, Aravind Narayanan, Rehana Riaz +2
Efficient evaluation changes the protocol used to support claims about model behavior, yet it is rarely tested whether those claims remain stable after the evaluation itself is made cheaper. We stress-test conclusion robustness in responsible-AI benchmarking by evaluating three dense and mixture-of-experts models on BBQ and BBQ-V under seven conditions spanning batching, quantization, benchmark reduction, and their combinations. Rather than treating preserved aggregate accuracy as sufficient, we compare accuracy, bias severity and prevalence, reasoning quality, subgroup behavior, subset-membership stability, runtime, and measured GPU energy against a full-benchmark BF16 baseline. Larger batching keeps accuracy within 0.35 percentage points of baseline and produces comparatively small subgroup changes, while reducing energy in five of six model--dataset settings. INT8 largely preserves quality but uses 1.79--4.26$\times$ baseline energy. INT4 causes larger, model- and context-dependent changes. Reduced benchmarks provide the most consistent savings, but very small subsets are substantially more sensitive to which items are retained. Efficient evaluation should therefore be treated as a measurement intervention whose validity must be checked across the conclusions the benchmark is intended to support. Our project website is https://vectorinstitute.github.io/sustainable-rai-evaluation/ and the code is available at https://github.com/VectorInstitute/sustainable-rai-evaluation.
Omri Asscher, Mirco Musolesi
Recent years have seen a growing discrepancy in the field of AI alignment: research and policy recommendations on AI ethics tend to assume a general set of ethical values, yet proliferating practice-specific uses of AI systems on the ground - in the legal, medical and translation domains, among others - have been effectively manifesting ethics of professional practice. This article begins by outlining the reasons why general and professional ethics are increasingly conflicted in contemporary AI systems, and by surveying how the research literature attests to, but has not yet resolved, this conceptual and practical challenge. We then conceptualize the main dimensions of AI models' decision-making in areas of professional practice, emphasizing professional ethics' hierarchically structured relationship with general ethics, and elaborating on the mechanisms through which they reach an equilibrium in situational contexts that involve conflict. It is through this equilibrium, we suggest, that certain professional ethics are prioritized over others and implemented in practice. We then show how our framework can be the basis for a systematic empirical assessment of AI models' professional ethics in various domains, identifying the nuances of the models' favored ethic by examining their production in a series of similar but not identical scenarios. Finally, we propose a formulation for how to intervene in and change AI models' favored ethics in professional practices - while noting the inherent dimension of subjectivity involved in both the evaluation and implementation of professional ethics in AI models.
Alistair Reid, Simon O'Callaghan, Dustin Venini +2
This report presents a framework to help organisations, policymakers and researchers reason about the risks that emerge when AI agents interact with each other, how those risks change as interactions cross organisational boundaries, and the controls that may help address them. As organisations deploy AI agents, those agents will increasingly interact with each other: inside the organisation, with the agents of partners, customers and suppliers, and with unknown counterparties on the open internet. Failures can emerge from the interactions themselves, and once those interactions cross an organisation's perimeter, no single organisation can fully see, control or govern them. The report introduces three deployment tiers, defined by the minimum common governance binding any two interacting agents: singular governance, where one organisation governs every agent; federated governance, where multiple organisations deploy into a shared environment under agreed rules; and open environments, where agents operate with no central authority and shared standards are adopted voluntarily if at all. Within each tier, the report examines risk factors, failure modes and available controls. It identifies who is positioned to apply the controls, and where no actor is positioned to act, it characterises the gap and the collective action required to close it.
74% published 2023+
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