Research Papers

Systematic reviews, scoping reviews, mapping studies, and related evidence syntheses are increasingly difficult to conduct with fully manual workflows as search volumes, update cycles, and synthesis requirements continue to expand. At the same time, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and large language models are rapidly entering review practice across query formulation, screening, extraction, categorization, appraisal support, and reporting. Yet the empirical evidence remains uneven, task-dependent, and insufficient to justify unconstrained automation. Existing standards such as PRISMA 2020, PRISMA-S, PRISMA-ScR, PRISMA-P, PRESS, and SWiM remain essential, but none provides an end-to-end operational standard for when AI use is methodologically appropriate, how it should be validated, which review decisions must remain human-led, and how AI involvement should be reported so that readers can audit it. This paper proposes ARISMA, an AI Reporting and Integration standard for Systematic Methods and Analysis. ARISMA treats AI as an inspected, benchmarked, logged, and reversible assistant rather than an autonomous reviewer. It is built around one governing principle: every consequential scientific decision must remain human-interpretable, human-auditable, and human-accountable. The paper contributes a lifecycle taxonomy, process guidance, stepwise recommendations across the review pipeline, a governance and provenance model, a tool-support framework, an AI-integrated reporting checklist, and a validation matrix. It also addresses legal, privacy, infrastructure, and sustainability considerations. The framework was iteratively refined through structured expert consultation. The result is a practical and auditable guideline for responsible AI-assisted evidence synthesis.

Interpretability is critical for machine learning models deployed in scientific space missions such as ESA's Ariel, where ground truth is unavailable during operations and physical plausibility must be assessed. While most explainable AI methods focus on feature attribution, this work investigates training data attribution through influence functions and introduces three key contributions for operational spectroscopy pipelines. First, influence is reformulated in terms of prediction rather than loss, enabling label-free deployment. Second, by leveraging the closed-form ridge solution of an Extreme Learning Machine, infinitesimal prediction influence is efficiently computed. Third, an influence-based conservative error proxy is derived by propagating training residuals through the influence sensitivities. Evaluated against simulated spectra, the proposed proxy correlates strongly with scale and shape-based spectral errors. Furthermore, influence functions enable the identification of the most influential samples and the approximation of the most harmful ones. Together, these results suggest that this approach can serve as an operational framework for scientific machine learning.

SHAP and LIME are now standard tools for interpreting black-box predictions, yet their outputs can vary substantially when the input is perturbed by small amounts of noise--a problem we observed firsthand in our previous work on food security in Madagascar (Ralinirina et al., 2025). This variability raises the question of whether such explanations can be trusted at all. We address it by constructing an auditing protocol that measures two properties of any post-hoc explainer: robustness (how stable the explanation is under input perturbation) and fidelity (whether the features deemed important actually drive the model's prediction). These two quantities are combined into a single Trust Score. We run the protocol on a multi-sectoral dataset from Madagascar (83 features, 253 records, 4 malnutrition classes) using three classifiers and two explainers, plus their regularized counterparts. The results are sobering: models with AUC above 0.99 can produce numerically degenerate or flatly uninformative explanations, and fidelity scores lose discriminative power when the model is overfitted. These findings suggest that auditing XAI outputs is not optional but necessary, particularly when they inform decisions in sensitive domains.

The unit of AI safety evaluation is still the individual model, yet language-model agents are increasingly deployed in interacting populations that read and write one another's decisions. This raises a question no single-agent audit can answer: an agent that is well-calibrated on its own may still be pulled toward a different decision by the agents around it. We study this on a security-triage task, where populations of language-model monitors decide whether to escalate or dismiss alerts, and into which we can inject a committed minority that always pushes one way. We find that two alerts a single agent judges almost identically on its own can drive collective behavior far apart, so auditing any one member need not reveal what the population will do. Yet that collective behavior can be predicted in advance. From a population's benign, adversary-free operation alone, we calibrate a response function that forecasts, before any attack is run, how far a committed minority will later move it. We then ask what shifts the outcome and find that letting agents see each other's reasoning neutralizes a weak attack, while only delaying it against a strong one, turning the question from whether the population converges on the adversaries' choice into when. Finally, we exclude the hypothesis of capture being an irreversible trap: once the committed agents are removed, the population drifts back toward where it began, so capture is a temporary state. Alignment in isolation is not alignment in a population, yet what a population will do under attack can be read in advance, from how it behaves before any adversary arrives.

In embodied AI, safety risk can be latent: a benign instruction and a safe scene become hazardous only when composed. Prior work has advanced embodied safety by varying visual contexts or evaluating execution-time dynamics, but the complementary axis of fixing the scene and varying only the instruction remains underexplored. We introduce GuardianBench, an instruction-contrastive benchmark grounded in international safety standards that isolates this latent contextual risk through 3,024 instruction-scene examples organized as same-scene Safe/Unsafe contrastive pairs across various hazard categories. Benchmarking state-of-the-art vision-language models (VLMs) reveals instruction-insensitive verdicts: models disproportionately approve both instructions under a given scene; across the primary models, average pair accuracy is only 24.1%. Our systematic rationale audit localizes the dominant failure: models fail to bind the instruction-relevant cues that differentiate safe from unsafe compositions. As a post-training case study, Verdict Log-Odds Supervision (VLOS), a lightweight verdict-level objective, substantially improves performance on open-weight backbones. Together, our latent contextual risk task formulation, standards-grounded contrastive benchmark construction, pair-level and rationale-level failure diagnosis, and benchmark-enabled verdict calibration establish GuardianBench as a controlled evaluation suite for exposing and improving safety reasoning over instruction-scene compositions under latent contextual risk.

Existing explainable deepfake forensic methods typically rely on task-adapted MLLM to jointly address detection, localization, and explanation. Inspired by agent-style tool use, we instead introduce a Perception-as-Tool paradigm and instantiate it as PATE-Forensics, which architecturally decouples detection and localization from explanation generation while coupling detection and localization as tightly as possible within a forensic perception tool. The DINOv3-based tool couples a multi-granularity detection module that integrates global, patch-level, and segment-level evidence with a cue-guided localization module by spatializing the patch-level and segment-level evidence into forgery score maps that guide dense mask prediction. The original image and forensic perception outputs produced by the tool form structured forensic context for a general-purpose MLLM, which is guided by prompt constraints to generate explanations without task-specific fine-tuning. On DDL-X Track 3, PATE-Forensics achieves the best official score of 0.89, outperforming the second-ranked team by 0.19 points. Our code is available at https://github.com/yqli00000/PATE-Forensics.

Do LLMs Know a Good Hypothesis When They See One? Logit-Based Energy Scoring Outperforms Prompted LLM-as-Judge for Scientific Hypothesis Ranking

Swati Rajwal, Sanjay Das, Tirthankar Ghosal

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for scientific hypothesis generation. However, evaluating generated hypotheses remains a challenge for trustworthy AI-enabled scientific workflows. Existing approaches often use LLMs as judges or rely on semantic similarity, which can favor familiar ideas over novel ones. We propose a logit-based energy scoring method that evaluates hypotheses using a language model's intrinsic confidence rather than comparative judgment. We benchmarked seven language models on 1,323 papers across 12 disciplines. Each paper was paired with its hypothesis and fifteen incorrect alternatives. Intrinsic scoring reached 33.0% Hit@1 pooled across both scorers, compared with 16.6% for prompted listwise ranking. The strongest configuration, a 1-billion-parameter model using logit-based energy scoring, reached 53.1%, though this was the maximum across 14 model-by-scorer combinations selected post hoc. Overall, intrinsic model confidence shows potential for scientific hypothesis evaluation. This study also motivates future research on confidence-based methods for trustworthy AI-enabled scientific discovery.

We demonstrate that AI models are broadly susceptible to a phenomenon we call model hypnosis, in which individually weak and seemingly irrelevant cues in the prompt can be systematically combined to strongly control model behavior. Model hypnosis occurs across model families and scales, including in frontier reasoning models, and hypnotic prompts can transfer between models. Because the model is controlled by inconspicuous textual choices, such as paraphrases and typos, model hypnosis presents new challenges and avenues for AI safety, and is a major hurdle for AI interpretability.

Small Language Models (SLMs) are increasingly deployed in resource-constrained, privacy-sensitive settings, where safety and bias failures can cause security and societal risks. However, existing AI safety\slash security\slash compliance benchmarks are designed for large language models that may not transfer reliably to SLMs. We therefore ask: Can these benchmarks effectively and reliably evaluate SLMs? To answer this question, we conduct a large-scale assessment of the effectiveness and robustness of these automated pipelines by evaluating five widely used benchmark suites across 26 open-source SLMs under a unified judging rubric, which assigns a score of 0, 1, or 0.5 to harmful, safe, or ambiguous/irrelevant responses, respectively. Across the benchmarks, ambiguous judgments dominate and correlate with prompt complexity and model architecture, indicating that {\em LLM-centric safety benchmarks are insufficient as standalone evidence for SLM safety assessment}. In general, the ambiguity rate increases with lexical density, output perplexity, and output length and decreases with lexical sophistication, self-coherence, and reply-prompt similarity. This reveals a capability-safety confound that mixes model capability with apparent safety. Since ambiguity is prevalent, aggregate mean-score leaderboards are mathematically brittle: model rankings change significantly under reasonable ambiguity treatments, even when the underlying outputs remain unchanged.

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.

AI agents increasingly work inside systems that govern how they delegate tasks, move information, execute actions, and use shared resources. Recent work already shows that deployment rules can change collective behavior. Here we ask which parts of an AI institution produce safety and how they do it. This is the first paper from POLIS, an ongoing research programme studying algorithmic institutions for multi-agent systems. We report a frozen 5,280-episode study suite. The main pre-specified delegation experiment spans four model families; a targeted high-conflict diagnostic adds three additional model endpoints. In matched structured workflows, the model sees different rule formulations and guards consult different authority states. We also vary the attractiveness of the immediate compliant internal/self fallback and allow blocked workflows to continue. A detailed constitutional prompt produces 0/384 realized violations. A provenance-aware executable guard also produces 0/384, although it blocks prohibited attempts in 51/384 episodes; 44/51 of those episodes later complete safely. The local-state guard's failures concentrate in scenarios where an ordinary transformation changes visible policy while originating authority stays fixed. In matched laundering scenarios, that guard admits violations in 22/96 episodes and provenance enforcement in 0/96 (p = 4.77 x 10^-7). A separate resource-allocation experiment shows that revealing the numerical value of an otherwise identical cap changes agent requests. In these structured workflows, the same final violation rate can hide very different mechanisms. The rule itself is only part of the institution. The authority state the system trusts matters, and so does the path available after a block.

Can AI systems be aligned to human values? The popularization of large language models (LLMs) and multi-modal foundation models has seen a rise in harms spanning from toxic speech and hallucinations to AI agents executing unauthorized actions. Within the field of AI safety, these harmful instances are often framed as the alignment problem, or of models being misaligned with human values. Researchers have responded by pursuing applied and theoretical AI value alignment efforts, often without specifying what they mean by human values. How does the field of AI value alignment conceive of human values? How are these conceptions of values technically operationalized and evaluated? What does the emergent theory of value from this field signify for the future of AI? We annotated 94 value alignment research papers to discern their implicit theory of values in AI. The majority do not define values, relying heavily on preferences as a stand in that runs the risk of reducing complex culturally situated concepts down to binary choices. As researchers dispense with using human annotators for model training and evaluation, turning instead to synthetic data and autorater approaches to aligning and evaluating models, we identify the potential to close off alternative methods for contesting and enacting values in foundation models. In making AI value alignments philosophical commitments explicit, we seek to bring great specificity and under explored perspectives in the debate on whether and how AI can address human values.